OCLA believes that strong anti-SLAPP legislation is sorely needed in Ontario, and has signed on in support of Greenpeace’s Anti-SLAPP campaign to pass Ontario’s Bill 83, Protection of Public Participation Act, 2013.
In this context, it is interesting to observe how SLAPPs are adjudicated in Quebec, the only province that has anti-SLAPP legislation. In 2009, the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure was amended to allow courts to summarily throw out SLAPP actions (Art. 54.1-54.5 C.C.P.).
The present post reports an important recent decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal, issued September 26, that rewrites the law with respect to appeals from interlocutory judgments refusing to dismiss an action pursuant to these provisions, and opens the door for such appeals.
When a party (typically, a vulnerable defendant) brings a motion pursuant to Art. 54.1-54.5 to dismiss an action as “improper,” there can be several outcomes: the motion is granted in full and the action is dismissed, the motion is dismissed in full, or the court may craft a unique remedy to address the imbalance of power between the parties. While Art. 26(4.1) provides appeal, with leave, from judgments dismissing an action as being improper, there is no specific provision that would permit an appeal, even with leave, from a judgment dismissing a motion to dismiss an action as improper, brought under Art. 54.1-54.5.
In the past, as a general rule, the Quebec Court of Appeal held that leave to appeal could not be granted from an interlocutory motion dismissing a motion brought under Art. 54.1, because such judgments were held to fall outside the cases listed in Art. 29 (see decisions surveyed in Cooperstock c. United Air Lines Inc., 2013 QCCA 526). In the present case, however, St-Pierre, J.A., who heard the motion for leave to appeal, referred the matter to a three-judge panel.
In this landmark decision, the three-judge panel ruled that interlocutory judgments dismissing a motion brought under Art. 54.1 are of the type that “cannot be remedied by final judgment,” fall within the scope of Art. 29(2), and as such, they are appealable with leave:
[13] Notons d’abord qu’il y a appel, sur permission d’un « jugement qui prononce sur la requête en annulation de saisie avant jugement » (art. 26, al. 2 (2)) et en matière d’injonction, suivant la règle générale de 29 (2). |
[13] First, we note that there is an appeal, with leave “from any judgment ruling on a motion to quash a seizure before judgment” (art. 26, para. 2 (2)) and in the case of injunctions, following the general rule of 29 (2). |
[14] Il doit en être de même de la mesure provisionnelle de 54.1, s’il y a apparence d’abus. |
[14] It must be equally true of the provisional measure of 54.1, if there is appearance of abuse. |
[15] Le législateur a voulu l’intervention du tribunal dès le début de l’instance afin de remédier à l’injustice alors existante, due à l’inégalité des forces respectives des parties en présence. Il a constaté que cette inégalité faussait le processus judiciaire en ce que les frais de défense à encourir et la menace, même peu probable, d’une condamnation à une somme élevée, avait l’effet nocif de faire taire les défendeurs et d’empêcher la participation citoyenne au débat public, essentielle entre autres à la protection de l’environnement. |
[15] The legislature intended the court to intervene early in the proceedings to address the then existing injustice due to the imbalance of strengths of the respective parties involved. It noted that this imbalance distorts the judicial process in that the costs incurred by the defense and the threat, even if unlikely, of an award of a high amount of damages, had the adverse effect of silencing defendants and preventing citizen participation in public debate, essential among other reasons for the protection of the environment. |
[16] Le seul fait d’intenter une poursuite-bâillon atteint pleinement cet objectif nocif, peu importe le maintien ou le rejet de l’action à la fin du procès, alors que deux ou trois années se seront écoulées. |
[16] The mere fact of bringing a SLAPP fully achieves this harmful goal, regardless of the retention or dismissal of the action at the end of the trial, while two or three years have passed. |
[17] En ce sens, le jugement final ne pourra remédier à l’effet bâillon créé au départ. D’où la nouvelle législation pour une intervention immédiate du tribunal. |
[17] In this sense, the final judgment cannot remedy the original effect of the gag created from the start. Hence, the new legislation for an immediate intervention of the court. |
(Unofficial French to English translation)
The September 26, 2013 decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Cooperstock c. United Air Lines Inc., 2013 QCCA 1670 is available at: http://canlii.ca/t/g0rbg
The full history of the case, including all pleadings, motions, and decisions, is available online at: http://untied.com/SLAPP/documents.shtml